We study the optimal taxation of top labor incomes. Top income earners are modeled as managers who operate a span of control technology as in Rosen (1982) . Managers are heterogeneous across talent, which is both effort-augmenting and total-factor-productivity improving. The latter gives rise to a positive scale-of-operations effect. A tax formula for optimal taxes is derived linking optimal marginal tax rates to preferences and technology parameters. We show how to quantify the model to the data using readily available firm level data. Our benchmark calibration focuses on the US. Our results suggest that optimal top taxes are roughly in line with the current statutory rates and, thus, are significantly lower than what previous optimal taxation studies that ignore the scale-of-operations effect have shown. Similar quantitative findings hold when we extend the analysis to a panel of developed countries. (JEL D31, H21, H24, M12, M52) * We thank Adriano Rampini for his valuable discussion and suggestions. We also thank
I N T R O D U C T I O N
Heightened concerns over recent trends in income inequality necessarily bring the taxation of high earners to the forefront of the policy agenda. 1 However, the vast literature in public finance is far from reaching consensus on what the top income tax rate should be: While the dominant view sets the optimal top tax rate above 70 percent, others have challenged the validity of such elevated taxes on various grounds. 2 This paper introduces a novel approach to modeling and quantifying the behavior of highly talented individuals in the economy, thus contributing to the aforementioned debate. We identify high earners with managers, and show how to exploit well established facts on firm size and managerial compensation to pin down the key forces shaping optimal income taxes. Contrary to the prevailing recommendations in the literature, we find that top income taxes at the optimum are actually aligned with the current statutory rates in the US.
Our approach is to take the standard optimal taxation environment and augment it with a role for managers via a span of control technology. The economy is static and it is populated by workers and managers. We focus on the optimal tax treatment of the latter class of individuals, motivated by the fact that a significant fraction of top income earners fall within managerial occupations in the data. 3 Managers are heterogeneous across talent, which is privately observed. A benevolent government values redistribution across types, but informational frictions hinder full insurance. Building on the seminal contribution of Mirrlees (1971) , optimal tax functions are only restricted by such informational asymmetries.
The production process is modeled by extending the span of control technology in Rosen (1982) to a framework with elastic labor supply. Specifically, managers operate separate productive units, hire workers and exert effort. The technology is such that managerial talent has a dual role. First, it affects effort productivity, which captures the quality of supervision or monitoring. Second, managerial ability affects the overall productivity of the firm. This channel captures the quality of indivisible managerial decisions, and creates a so-called scale-of-operations effect. 4 Crucially, this effect magnifies the impact of skill variations on firm size and compensation differentials. In other words, for a given distribution of skills, a larger scale-of-operations generates more right skewness in the distribution of firm sizes and pre-tax income. Such a mapping from talent to observables has profound implications on our quantitative exercise, as we discuss below.
We characterize the constrained efficient allocation and show that it can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium with taxes levied on income and on firm size (measured as the size of the hired workforce). The former tax is standard in the public finance literature, while the latter is not. A positive marginal tax on firm size forces managers to operate below optimal scale.
Our first result provides normative grounds for the use of firm size taxation. We find that, in general, the government should forgo efficiency in the allocation of labor in order to relax the incentive constraints of the managers. We isolate a sufficient condition on the technology for optimal firm distortions to disappear. We show that such condition is satisfied when the scale-of-operations effect is shut down, or when the technology is Cobb-Douglas. In this sense, our environment nests the well known Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) efficiency result as a special case.
We then look at optimal income taxation. We start the analysis by providing a formula for optimal top marginal tax rates. As it is standard, our tax formula links marginal rates to the assumed distribution of talent, the redistributive motives of the policy maker, and the elasticity of labor supply of the manager. In addition, a positive scale-of-operations affects the level of optimal taxes via two channels: the first one is explicit in the tax formula, while the second one is implicit. Explicitly, the scale-of-operations impacts optimal taxes by shaping the relative productivity of skills and effort (the two components of managerial input), and by modifying the sensitivity of such a relationship to changes in labor supply. We show that the combined effect is positive when the technology displays constant elasticity of substitution between managerial and workers' inputs. In a nutshell, given a distribution of talent, larger values for the scale-of-operations generate more skewness in pre-tax income. This creates a force for higher marginal taxes to level the playing field. 5 The implicit effect arising from a positive scale-of-operations is connected to the shape of the underlying density of managerial skills. More precisely, given a distribution of earnings or other observables, the intrinsic distribution of skills becomes less skewed as the scale-of-operations effect rises. This implies that any given dispersion of pre-tax income, for example, can now be rationalized with a smaller dispersion in skills. In contrast with the explicit effect discussed previously, this channel actually reduces optimal marginal taxes (all else equal). The logic is now reversed: High income managers operating large firms are not as high talent as implied by a model which ignores the scale-of-operations effect. Hence, those individuals should not be subject to very high taxes, as implied by the textbook tax formula. We take the model to the data to quantitatively evaluate the forces discussed above, and to 5 A rule of thumb for income tax design is that high marginal taxes are attractive when few individuals are affected at the margin, but many individuals are taxed inframarginally (and, hence, without distortion) . This occurs, for instance, whenever the distribution of pre-tax income, or the distribution of skills exhibit high levels of right skewness (or "thick" right tails). provide specific normative recommendations on top optimal marginal tax rates. To determine tax rates we require the identification of two key objects: the parameter governing the scaleof-operations effect, and the distribution of managerial talent at the top. We identify these parameters by following the insights from Rosen (1982) . We start by deriving equilibrium restrictions relating the distribution of talent with firm size, sales, and profits of the firm. Using such conditions, we first show that the scale-of-operations effect can be written as a function of the elasticity of firm size with respect to sales, and the elasticity of managerial compensation relative to sales, both of which can be backed out from the data. We pin down these elasticities by using COMPUSTAT data, and well established regularities of managerial compensation.
The second object that requires to be calibrated is the distribution of talent at the top. This is uncovered from the observed distribution of firm size and by exploiting the mapping between talent and firm size predicted by our model. Notably, here we depart from the established approach in public finance which instead recovers the ability distribution directly from the distribution of income (see, e.g., Saez (2001) ). Given that income data is usually confidential and top coded, we believe that the alternative route that we propose has certain advantages when it comes to availability and reliability. We find that, in the presence of a positive scaleof-operations effect, the talent distribution is substantially more compact than in previous studies: Assuming that the right tail is Pareto distributed, our estimate on the tail parameter is an order of magnitude larger than what was previously identified in the literature.
The optimal top tax rate in our benchmark calibration is 32.4 percent. This number is significantly lower than what is obtained in standard environments, such as Diamond and Saez (2011) , where top tax rates can be as high as 80 percent. Moreover, the top tax rate in the US tax code falls within the range of estimates in our calibration. 6 Our span of control production function and the implied compactness in the upper tail of the skill distribution are key in generating these results. For comparison, the optimal rate is equal to 65.4 percent when using the same calibration but absent a scale-of-operations effect. We also extend the analysis to a panel of developed countries, including Australia, Canada and nine European countries.
We find that benchmark optimal top tax rates are mostly concentrated within the 34-50 percent range, and are strikingly similar across the nations in our sample. We also quantify the optimal marginal tax on firm size. We find it to be positive, progressive, and creating a markup of 1.5-2 percent over the workersï£¡ wage.
R E L A T E D L I T E R A T U R E
This paper touches on two large literatures: the first one concerns managerial compensation and the second one deals with the taxation of top income earners.
A growing literature has modeled CEOs with heterogeneous talent that map into firm 6 Saez et al. (2012) report a top 1% marginal rate of approximately 42.5% for 2009. Using the Current Population Survey in the same period we find top marginal income tax rates of 33.5% for federal and 5% for state. performance and managerial compensation schemes. Lucas (1978) and Rosen (1982) provide early frameworks where the compensation of the CEO (the owner of the span of control technology) can be analyzed jointly with firm size. Terviö (2008) , Gabaix and Landier (2008) , Edmans et al. (2009) , on the other hand, consider models where firm size is fixed exogenously, and the most productive managers are assigned to the largest firms. 7 The key in all of these models is that they introduce a nonlinear mapping between compensation and talent of the manager. In particular, the distribution of compensation is more positively skewed than the one for talent, which the key mechanism in our paper. 8 Contributing to this line of literature, we model the intensive margin of managerial effort. This is a necessary step to think about top income taxation.
The literature on optimal taxation of top income earners is vast. 9 Methodologically, our contribution with respect to this literature is twofold. First, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that recovers the distribution of talent consistent with production functions which are nonlinear in skills, and that studies the corresponding tax implications. Second, our environment is one in which compensation of the agent (the manager in our case) is endogenous. This is a departure from the classic taxation environment where wages are fixed exogenously. Stiglitz (1982) originally analyzes taxation under endogenous wages in a model where workers of different types interact within an aggregate production function. As we clarify below, though, the nature of wage endogeneity in our model is quite different from the one that Stiglitz considers. 10 Given that our approach is to map top income earners to managers, Rothschild and Scheuer (2013) and Scheuer (2014) are also related to our work. 11 These authors consider an environment where agents are characterized by a multidimensional skill/taste vector and decide whether to be a worker or a manager. These papers isolate a force for lowering top taxes, like we do, but our mechanism is quite different from theirs. Specifically, in the spirit of Stiglitz (1982) , Rothschild and Scheuer (2013) and Scheuer (2014) obtain that reducing taxes on individuals with high ability increases the productivity of lower types, therefore relaxing incentive constraints. In our framework, on the other hand, managerial effort has no effect on 7 Other theoretical contributions in this area include Baker and Hall (2004) , Edmans and Gabaix (2011) , Baranchuk et al. (2011), and Eisfeldt and Kuhnen (2013) . An incomplete list of empirical studies emphasizing the key role of CEO abilities include Bertrand and Schoar (2003) , Adams et al. (2005) , Bennedsen et al. (2007) , Kaplan et al. (2012) , Custòdio and Metzger (2013) , and . 8 This important feature also differentiates our paper from Baranchuk et al. (2011) , who embed moral hazard in a superstars model and derive implications on firm size and CEO compensation. Differently, we model explicitly the managerial scale-of-operations effect. The skewness of firm size distribution endogenously generated in our model is not only driven by the complementarity between talent and managerial effort (as in Baranchuk et al. (2011) ), but also from the complementarity between talent and span-of-control. 9 For a review refer to Mankiw et al. (2009) and Diamond and Saez (2011) . 10 More recent work on taxation under endogenous wages include Slavík and Yazıcı (2014) and . The former focus on the endogenous accumulation of different forms of capital that interact differently with agents of diverse talent, while the latter study an assignment problem of workers with heterogeneous talents to tasks with heterogeneous complexity. 11 The environment in this paper is static. For dynamic models that consider the modeling and taxation of entrepreneurial wealth, refer to Quadrini (2000) , Cagetti and Nardi (2006) , Albanesi (2011 ) or Shourideh (2012 . other managers' productivities as they operate separate firms. 12 Instead, the main mechanism which lowers top taxes in our paper is connected to the calibration of the skill distribution. 13 Piketty et al. (2014) also considers a model of CEO taxation. In that paper, the CEO can extract surplus by imposing a negative externality on workers, thus raising her own compensation above her marginal product. This channel provides an upward pressure on marginal tax rates, which corrects for the negative CEO externality. Our approach to modeling managers, on the other hand, is more in line with the empirical evidence in Kaplan and Rauh (2013) , according to which managers generate a positive externality on workers rather than a negative one.
Finally, this paper is related to the more recent work of and Scheuer and Werning (2015) . Both of these papers study an optimal managerial/superstar taxation problem in competitive assignment environments. In these papers, top income earners of heterogeneous abilities are matched to fixed factors (firm assets), as in Terviö (2008) and Gabaix and Landier (2008) . In our paper, on the other hand, firm size is endogenous and it is affected by managerial ability as well as the tax code. One way to interpret this difference is to view and Scheuer and Werning (2015) as studying short run taxation implications where firm sizes do not adjust, while we provide a framework for the design of taxation in the long run where firm size is allowed to vary.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the environment.
In Section 3 we characterize Pareto optimality. In Section 4 we look at the decentralization of the optimum and derive the optimal tax rate formula. In Section 5 we show our identification strategy and calibrate the model. In Section 6 we discuss the quantitative results on income taxes for the US, and Section 7 computes income taxes across a panel of countries. In Section 8 we analyze optimal firm size distortions. Section 9 concludes.
E N V I R O N M E N T
The economy is static and it is populated by a unit measure of workers and a unit measure of managers. There is a single consumption good. Managers have quasi-linear preferences over consumption c and effort n, which are represented by the utility function
12 Effort of the manager does affect the productivity of the workers, but given that the latter are subject to a different tax schedule this has no impact on managerial incentives to work below full potential. See Section 6.1 for details. 13 Golosov et al. (2015) and Huggett and Badel (2015) uncover different forces lowering optimal top tax rates in dynamic models.
where v : R + → R and is twice continuously differentiable with positive derivatives. Our specification for preferences abstracts from income effects. 14 Workers have preferences over consumption and supply labor inelastically. Without loss of generality, we normalize the disutility from effort of the worker to zero and the amount of effective effort supplied to one. Consumption of the worker is denoted by c w ∈ R + .
Managers are heterogeneous with respect to managerial talent, denoted by θ ∈ Θ with Θ = θ, θ ⊂ R + \ 0. Managerial talent, θ, is distributed according to the cumulative distribution function F : Θ → [0, 1] with density function f : Θ → R + . Following Rosen (1982) and Lucas (1978) , managers operate a span of control technology. Specifically, managers with talent θ produce final output y according to:
where L is hired labor and γ is the scale-of-operation parameter. We focus on the case with γ ≥ 0. The production function H : R + × R + → R + is concave, strictly increasing in both arguments and features continuous derivatives. We further assume that y nθ ≥ 0.
Managerial talent enters the production function (1) in two ways. First, θ is effortaugmenting, as it multiplies n within H. Second, θ improves total factor productivity since γ ≥ 0. We refer to the latter effect γ as the scale-of-operations effect, following Mayer (1960). 15 This formulation is in line with the one in Rosen (1982) , where managers' actions naturally affect the productivity of all workers under their supervision. But unlike the technology in Rosen's paper, we also incorporate elastic managerial effort n as an intensive margin.
In what follows, it is convenient to define n(y, L, θ) as the effort required by a manager of talent θ to generate output y when hired labor is L. An allocation in this economy is then defined as (c w , c, y, L), where c w ∈ R + , c : Θ → R + , L : Θ → R + , y : Θ → [0,ȳ], and 0 <ȳ < ∞. We assume that c(θ), y(θ) and L(θ) are observable, while θ, n(θ) and θ · n(θ) are private information to each θ-agent.
For a given level of (exogenous) government consumption G ≥ 0, an allocation is feasible if
and Θ L(θ)dF (θ) ≤ 1.
(3) 14 Empirical analyses typically indicate that income effects are relatively small compared to substitution effects. See, e.g., Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) . 15 See Bartelsman and Doms (2000) and references therein for additional details on the relationship between managerial talent, firm size and firm productivity.
Social welfare is evaluated according to the social welfare function
where Ψ : R → R is a strictly increasing, differentiable and concave function which summarizes social preferences for redistribution. In particular, we refer to Ψ (c(θ) − v(n(θ))) as the social marginal welfare weight on managers of talent θ.
P A R E T O O P T I M A L I T Y
In this section, we characterize Pareto optimal allocations using a direct mechanism where managers report their talent θ to a social planner and are assigned an allocation for consumption c(θ), output y(θ) and labor L(θ) accordingly. Define n(y(θ ), L(θ ), θ) as the level of effort exerted by a manager of talent θ who mimics a manager of talent θ . In this case, manager θ is assigned L(θ ) workers and is required to produce output y(θ ). An allocation is incentive-compatible when truthful revelation is optimal for all managers, which requires:
Pareto optimal allocations solve the following social planner's problem:
s.t.
(2), (3) and (4).
The next proposition provides a useful characterization of incentive compatibility with quasilinear utility.
Proposition 1. Let n(θ) ≡ n(y(θ), L(θ), θ), U (θ) ≡ c(θ) − v(n(θ)), and denote by n y , n L and n θ , the first derivatives of n(y, L, θ) with respect to its first, second and third arguments, respectively, with similar notation for its second derivatives. Then incentive compatibility constraints (4) hold if and only if for all θ ∈ Θ:
and v (n(θ)) v (n(θ)) 2 c (θ) + n θy (θ) n θ (θ)
Proof. See Appendix A.
As it is standard in the optimal taxation literature, from here onwards we assume that the monotonicity condition (6) is satisfied at the optimum. 16 The condition holds, for example, when c, y and L are increasing in θ and n θL is small enough. 17 ' 18 In practice, we apply a first order approach to the planning problem, in which the original set of constraints (4) is replaced by local first order conditions. The relaxed version of the planner's problem can be written as:
Before presenting the decentralization and showing the properties of the optimal tax system, we discuss the incentive constraint (5) further. In the standard Mirrleesian environment, output, talent, and effort are related through y(θ) = θ · n(θ), so that effort required to generate output y is n(y, θ) = y/θ. In that case, the term n θ appearing on the right hand side of (5) is given by n θ (y, θ) = −n(θ)/θ and, hence, the incentive constraint can be written only in terms of the level of effort. In our environment, on the other hand, the incentive constraints will generally incorporate labor as an additional margin for incentive provision. To be precise, suppose (as in Rosen (1982) ) that H satisfies constant returns to scale. Then by definition
The first term in (10) is the same expression which emerges in the standard Mirrleesian environment discussed previously. Indeed, when γ = 0 the incentive constraint boils down to the traditional formulation of Mirrlees. In contrast, the second term in (10) is novel to our environment. Through this term, n θ and, hence, the right hand side of the incentive constraint (5), will explicitly depend on L. This implies that by properly choosing labor, the social planner may relax the incentive constraint. In the sections below we show that the distorted choice of L is implemented with a nonlinear tax on firm size, which is at the cost of production efficiency.
Before closing this section, it is worth noting that the ability of the planner to affect incentives by changing L depends on the functional form of H. In particular, suppose that H is Cobb-Douglas so that: y = θ γ (θ · n) α L 1−α for some 0 < α < 1. We have:
so that in this case the incentive constraint does not explicitly depend on labor. In our discussion below, however, we focus on a more general formulation for H featuring constant elasticity of substitution (CES). In fact, our calibration exercise demonstrates the Cobb-Douglas case is not empirically relevant when it comes to reconciling a positive scale-of-operations effect using firm level data.
O P T I M A L T A X A T I O N
Next we construct a decentralization of the optimum in (PO) that relies on nonlinear taxes on firm size (T L ) and nonlinear taxes on income (T ). We then discuss certain properties of these tax functions.
In the decentralized environment, managers of talent θ solve the following problem, taking wages and tax rates as given:
where w ∈ R + is the real wage, T : R + → R is a nonlinear income tax, and T L : R + → R is a nonlinear tax on firm size. Since workers in our environment supply labor inelastically, their problem is characterized by a simple budget constraint c w = w + φ, where φ is a government transfer to the worker. We can now define a competitive equilibrium for our environment:
Definition 1. For a given level of government consumption G, a tax distorted competitive equilibrium is an allocation {c, y, L}, a tax system {T, T L , φ}, and a wage w such that:
1. Taking as given {w, T, T L } each θ-manager solves (MP);
2. The worker's budget constraint holds: c w = w + φ;
3. Goods and labor markets clear: equations (7) and (8) hold;
4. The government's budget constraint is balanced:
By applying a version of the taxation principle (see, e.g., Guesnerie (1981) ) we derive the following proposition:
Proposition 2. Let X ≡ c w , (c(θ), y(θ), L(θ)) θ∈Θ be an optimal allocation solving (PO). Then there exist a tax system {T, T L , φ} and a wage w such that X can be decentralized as a tax distorted competitive equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
We refer to the tax system that implements the allocation X above as the optimal one. We next proceed to characterize the optimal tax system.
F I R M S I Z E T A X A T I O N
We begin by looking at the distortions on firm size implied by the constrained efficient allocation.
Such distortions provide a normative rationale for firm size taxation in the decentralization.
Assuming differentiability of T L , first order conditions from the manager's problem (MP) give:
where y L is the marginal product of the worker. 19 Equation (14) shows that if T L (wL(θ)) = 0 for some θ, the worker's marginal product is not equalized across firms. This implies a break down of the well known Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) productive efficiency result.
The reason behind the willingness of the planner to distort labor allocations lies in the ability to relax incentive constraints by affecting L as discussed at the end of Section 3. The next proposition provides a formula for optimal firm size distortions and gives sufficient conditions under which it is optimal not to distort firm level employment.
Proposition 3. Let {y(θ), n(θ), L(θ)} θ∈Θ be a solution of (PO-FOC) and let T L be part of an optimal tax system. Then:
1. Optimal marginal firm size distortions satisfy:
where µ(θ) ≥ 0 is the multiplier on the incentive constraint (5), and λ l > 0 and λ r > 0 are the multipliers on (8) and (7), respectively.
2. If there is a differentiable g : R + → R + such that n θ = g(n(θ)) for all θ ∈ Θ, then T L (wL(θ)) = 0 for all θ ∈ Θ.
Proof. See Appendix B.2. 19 Here we use that yL = −nL/ny, which simply follows from the implicit function theorem.
Part 1 of Proposition 3 illustrates how, in general, a binding incentive constraint generates nonzero firm level distortions. Part 2 provides a sufficient condition for distortions to disappear.
Following the discussion at the end of Section 3, it is immediate that this condition is satisfied in the case in which γ = 0 and H is constant return to scale, or when H is Cobb-Douglas. 20
I N C O M E T A X A T I O N
We now move to income taxation. Assuming differentiability of T , first order conditions from the manager's problem (MP) imply:
where π(θ) ≡ y(θ) − wL(θ) − T L (L(θ)) corresponds to income of a manager with talent θ.
For the rest of the analysis, we make a standard assumption on preferences:
The next proposition characterizes optimal marginal income tax rates. To simplify notation, we refer to T (π(θ)) as T (θ), unless stated otherwise. and let {T, T L , w} be an optimal tax system. We have that for all θ:
where
Equation (17) highlights the main forces that shape optimal marginal income tax rates in our framework. The first two terms are well known in the literature. The first term looks at the effect of the shape of the talent distribution on marginal tax rates. In particular, high marginal taxes at talent level θ are attractive when the mass of managers above θ, given by (1 − F (θ)), is large. At the same time, the resulting distortion is proportional to the mass of individuals at θ and to their productivity level, explaining the negative dependence on θf (θ). The second term summarizes the redistributive tastes of the government. Unsurprisingly, optimal marginal taxes on a given manager decrease as the corresponding social welfare weight rises.
The third term in the formula is novel and captures the relative contribution of the two components of managerial input, i.e. skills and effort, into output. More precisely, (y θ /y n ) · (θ/n) is the ratio between the output elasticity of talent, and the output elasticity of effort. When this term is large, high marginal taxes are warranted. The reason is that, in such a scenario, the relative contribution of innate skills to income inequality is more pronounced than the contribution of elastic effort. Consequently, redistributive taxes can level the playing field without triggering large efficiency costs.
The last term in square brackets represents the impact of effort responses on optimal tax rates. The standard labor supply channel is encapsulated by the Frisch elasticity ε, which measures how changes in after-tax wages affect the labor supply (holding the marginal utility of wealth constant). A low Frisch elasticity translates into a small effort response to tax hikes, which raises optimal marginal tax rates. But labor supply variations also modify the relative contribution of skills and effort into output and, hence, compensation. This effect is captured by the elasticity d ln (y θ /y n ) /dn. Given that this coefficient is positive, 21 reductions in effort lower the relative productivity of talent, which is the source of managerial rents. In turn, a high value of this elasticity deters the manager from reducing effort, thus providing a rationale for high tax rates.
Our tax formula nests traditional expressions for optimal income taxes in the literature. In particular, suppose that γ = 0 so that y = H(θn, L). In that case, it is straightforward to show that: y θ y n θ n = 1, and d ln y θ yn d ln n = y θn y θ n − y nn y n n = 1.
Substituting into (17) we obtain the classic tax formula from Diamond (1998) or Saez (2001) in terms of underlying structural parameters:
The next section untangles how a positive scale-of-operations parameter generates a departure from the standard tax formula in (DS).
T O P I N C O M E T A X A T I O N U N D E R C E S T E C H N O L O G Y
Proposition 4 applies to quite general production functions H. To lay the groundwork for our quantitative analysis we make the following parametric assumption on the production function: 22 21 Recall that y θn ≥ 0 and ynn ≤ 0. 22 The estimation procedure described in Section 5 can be extended to other production functions as long as the production function satisfies constant returns to scale. Assumption 2. The production function has constant elasticity of substitution:
where ρ ∈ [−∞, 1] and the elasticity of substitution between θn(θ) and L(θ) is given by
The following corollary characterizes optimal income taxes under Assumption 2. 23 Corollary 1. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, and that (6) is satisfied. Then at any Pareto optimum, T (θ) satisfies
where κ(θ) ≡ y L (θ)L(θ)/y(θ) is the share of labor costs to total sales for managers of talent θ.
Proof. See Appendix B.4.
The Scale-of-Operations Effect
The parameter γ impacts optimal tax rates via three channels. The first two are explicit in formula (18), but the last one is not. We discuss each effect in turn.
First, a larger γ leads to a larger output-talent elasticity relative to effort through (y θ /y n ) · (θ/n), which translates into higher marginal taxes. Second, under the CES specification d ln (y θ /y n ) /d ln n decreases with γ. In words, the relative weight of skills and effort into output becomes less sensitive to changes in n as γ grows. The latter leads to lower marginal taxes, as discussed in the previous section. Under CES technology, though, the first effect dominates, which can be verified by inspecting (18).
The third effect is implicit in the tax formula. In a nutshell, given a distribution of earnings or other observables, the underlying distribution of skills becomes less "spread out" when γ grows. This effect reduces optimal tax rates through the first term on the right hand side of (18). While this channel will be analyzed in detail in Section 5 below, here we provide a heuristic illustration.
Consider an observable variable z (such as income or firm size) which is monotonic in θ,
so that the left hand side, and hence optimal tax rates, are inversely related to the elasticity of z with respect to θ. Crucially, in a decentralized environment, such an elasticity increases with γ, which is the nature of superstar effects considered by Rosen. In that sense, a positive scale-of-operations effect is consistent with a distribution for managerial ability which is more compressed than what previous studies have considered.
Top Income Taxation
To provide a benchmark for the optimal top income tax rate we make the following assumption:
Assumption 3.
(a) The talent distribution has a right Pareto tail with parameter a > 0:
(b) There is zero social marginal welfare weight at the top: lim θ→θ D(θ) = 0. 24
Let lim θ→θ κ(θ) =κ. Taking limits on (18) and using Assumption 3 we get an expression for the optimal marginal tax rate at the top:
Corollary 2. Suppose Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold. Then at any Pareto optimum the optimal marginal tax at the top satisfies:
In the next section, we take equation (20) to the data and quantitatively evaluate the overall effect of the scale-of-operations effect on optimal tax rates.
I D E N T I F I C A T I O N A N D E S T I M A T I O N
The tax formula in (20) provides insights on the forces that shape top marginal tax rates. In this section we quantify these forces. Two parameters which are crucial for this quantitative evaluation are the scale-of-operations parameter γ and the Pareto tail parameter of the talent distribution a. Our main contribution in this section is to show how to estimate such parameters using firm level data.
As a first step, in Section 5.1 we derive equilibrium restrictions which relate the distribution of talent with firm size, sales, and profits. Those relationships are then used in Sections 5.2 and 5.3 to estimate γ and a, respectively. 24 Assuming zero social weight at the top provides a benchmark that allows easy comparison with the bulk of the optimal taxation literature. It is clearly an extreme assumption. Weinzierl (2014) looks at survey evidence on preferred societal welfare criterions. Saez and Stantcheva (2015) derive tax formulas under arbitrary marginal social weights.
F I R M L E V E L E L A S T I C I T I E S
The approach is along the lines of Rosen (1982) . We make the following assumption:
Assumption 4. The production function H satisfies constant returns to scale.
Consider a competitive equilibrium where the manager faces a linear tax τ on her income, pays wage w (taken as given) to each unit of labor input L, and gets a fraction χ ∈ (0, 1] of total profits. 25 Due to the constant returns to scale assumption, we can write the θ-manager's problem as max {L,n,π}
where h θn L ≡ H θn L , 1 , h > 0, and h < 0. The first order conditions with respect to L and n in (21) are given by:
and
Equations (22) and (23) (21), and let σ be the elasticity of substitution between θn and L. Then the following relationships hold:
where κ(θ) ≡ wL(θ)/y(θ).
Proof. See Appendix C.1.
Lemma 1 reveals a key property of the scale-of-operations effect: for a given distribution of talent, the distributions of firm size, sales, and profits become more skewed as γ grows. In particular once we shut down the scale-of-operations effect (γ = 0) then the growth rates in (24)-(26) are all equal to (1 + ε). However, in general, L, y, and π respond more to differences in managerial talent when γ is positive. 26 Finally, it is worthwhile observing that as long as the ownership share χ and the top marginal income tax rate τ are constant across talents, they do not impact the growth rates of firm size, output, and profits in Lemma 1 and, hence, it does not bias our estimation strategy. 27
Using the expressions in Lemma 1 we obtain the next proposition:
Proposition 5. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 4 hold. Then for any solution of the θ-manager's problem in (21) the following relationship holds:
Proof. See Appendix C.2.
Equation (27) forms the basis for the estimation of γ. Specifically, to evaluate γ we require the elasticity of firm size with respect to sales (d ln L(θ)/d ln y(θ)), the elasticity of managerial compensation with respect to sales (d ln π(θ)/d ln y(θ)), the elasticity of substitution (σ) and the Frisch elasticity (ε). Below we discuss how each of these are estimated.
Elasticity of firm size with respect to sales (d ln L/d ln y) To estimate this elasticity we consider the following linear relationship:
where ln y t (θ i ) is the log of firm sales, ln L t (θ i ) is the log of firm size, and Div j are industry division dummies.
We look at data from publicly traded US firms in COMPUSTAT. The sample is constructed at an annual frequency from 2000 to 2012. 28 Data on firm sales is taken from Gross Sales in the Income Statement, and data on the total number of employees is taken from the Employees 26 This property is at the heart of Rosen's analysis. In his own words: "This is what maintains the observed long-tailed distribution of income at the top ranks: the distribution of rewards is more skewed than the distribution of talent (...)" (Rosen (1982) , page 317). In fact, it is straightforward to verify that if ε = 0 the relationships in Lemma 1 map to equations (14)-(16) in his paper. 27 If managers were subject to a nonlinear income tax schedule, the formulas in Lemma 1 would incorporate terms with second derivatives of the tax function. However, the impact of those terms is negligible at the top, given that the tax schedule is progressive but concave in US data. The widely used parameterization in Gouveia and Strauss (1994) , for example, has this implication. In fact, under that specification the marginal tax rate converges to a constant. 28 From our sample we drop firms that report negative or zero sales and firms with duplicate CUSIP. Our employment data does not distinguish between managerial and non managerial employees. To overcome this limitation we assume that the number of top executives is fixed across firms. Also, we only consider firms above (and including) the median firm size for each
year, which minimizes the impact of assuming a fixed number of top executives. To see this, notice that for large firms the relationship between sales and non managerial employees can be approximated as follows:
As a benchmark, we assume that the number of top executives is 20. From (28) In Table 1 we report details about our benchmark estimation (Column (1)) along with additional robustness checks. Columns (2) − (4) look at the impact of extending the time period and the effect of either industry or year dummies. Columns (5) − (6) look at the effect of changing the decile of firm size included. We observe that our estimate, with either slightly larger or smaller values, is robust to changes in specification. Finally, in Figure 1 we also report our estimates when changing the number of top executives from 1 to 50. The Figure   also includes the comparison between our benchmark estimation and the case in which firms below the median size are included.
Elasticity of managerial compensation with respect to sales (d ln π/d ln y) Starting from Roberts (1956) , there is a vast literature estimating the elasticity of managerial compensation with respect to firm size in the cross-section. 30 This literature has highlighted an empirical regularity, usually denoted as "Roberts's Law," which states that, on average, managerial compensation is proportional to a power of 1/3 on own firm size. Accordingly, in our benchmark calculation, following Gabaix and Landier (2008) , we set d ln π d ln y = 0.34.
29 Division refers to industry groupings. The 10 divisions considered are: Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing; Mining; Construction; Manufacturing; Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services; Wholesale Trade; Retail Trade; Finance, Insurance and Real Estate; Services; Public administration. 30 See also Lewellen and Huntsman (1970) , Baker et al. (1988) , Gabaix and Landier (2008) , Frydman and Saks (2010), or Alder (2012) . Benchmark" refers to estimates of (28) using firms above the median size, "All Sample" refers to estimates of (28) also including firms below the median firm size.
Number of Top Executives

Frisch elasticity (ε), and elasticity of substitution (σ)
We set the value of ε based on previous studies. Specifically, following the guidelines of Chetty et al. (2011) we set ε equal to 0.5 for our benchmark calibration. 31 To pin down the elasticity of substitution σ, we assume it is constant (as in the case with CES technology) and rely on equilibrium modeling restrictions. 32 Given the values for the elasticities d ln π/d ln y and d ln y/d ln L estimated previously, equation in the benchmark calibration and perform a robustness check on this parameter in Section 6. 33 Other values of ε would yield a different feasible range for σ, as it is shown in Figure 2 .
Overall, from Figure 2 we see that the feasible range for σ precludes a Cobb-Douglas production function (σ = 1) for empirically relevant values of ε.
We can now determine γ using equation (27) in Proposition 5. We get:
There exists an extensive literature devoted to the estimation of the elasticity of labor supply. For prime age males MaCurdy (1981) and Altonji (1986) estimate an elasticity between 0 to 0.54. Saez (2003) using the NBER tax panel from 1979 to 1981, estimates a labor elasticity of 0.25. Similar ranges are estimated by Blundell et al. (2014) and French (2005) . Chetty et al. (2011) find values equal to 0.5 on the intensive margin and 0.25 on the extensive margin. 32 There is little direct empirical evidence on how managerial effort substitutes with hired factors of production, such as the number of workers. A possible strategy to identify σ is to use the aggregate behavior of wages over time. For example, Katz and Murphy (1992) use an aggregate production function and estimate an elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers of 1.4. Replicating their approach and partitioning the population into workers in managerial and non managerial positions, we arrive at an estimate of the elasticity of substitution between workers and managers of around 4, which is close to the benchmark value in our calibration. 33 This choice for σ corresponds to a value of ρ = 4 5 in the production function of Assumption 2. Notes: Estimates of α1 in (28). Column (1) displays benchmark calculation using COMPUSTAT data (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) . "Year dummy" denotes the inclusion or not of yearly dummies. "Division dummy" highlights the inclusion or not in (28) Next we discuss the estimation of the Pareto parameter a for the distribution of managerial talent.
E S T I M A T I N G T H E T A I L O F T H E T A L E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N a
In this subsection we show how to recover the shape of the tail of the talent distribution using the distribution of firm sizes. This approach differs from the standard approach of estimating such a parameter based on the observed distribution of incomes (which is discussed in Appendix E for robustness purposes). The main advantage of our approach is that firm level data is readily available and comprehensive. This is a striking difference with respect to income data which in many instances is survey based and top-coded.
We start by deriving a relationship between the tail of the talent distribution and the tail of the firm size distribution. Given Assumption 3, the maximum likelihood estimate of a satisfies: 34
where {θ 1 , . . . , θ N } is a given a realization of managerial talent, and θ is the minimum possible value of θ. If we let a L denote the tail parameter of the Pareto distribution of firm size, the analogue to (29) yields:
(ln(L(θ i )) − ln(L(θ))) . From equation (24) in Lemma 1 we have that:
Finally, combining (29) 
Using equation (32) and the parameters of Section 5.2, the Pareto tail parameter a can be inferred from the observed value for a L , and the share of labor costs at the topκ. We pin down these parameters as follows. First, it is well documented that the distribution of firm size exhibits a Pareto distribution with tail parameter close to one. Taking the estimate from Axtell (2001), we set a L = 1.06. Second, combining equations (24)-(26) from Lemma 1 we obtain: 36
using the estimated elasticities d ln L/d ln y and d ln π/d ln y into (33) we getκ ≈ 0.93. 37 Plugging in our estimates into equation (32), we obtain a = 1 + 0.30 × 5 1 − 0.93 + 0.5 × 1 + 0.30 1 − 0.93 × 1.06 ≈ 26.13.
The above analysis shows that the distribution of talent is significantly less skewed than the distribution of firm size: a is an order of magnitude larger than a L . 38 Fundamentally, this big difference relies on a positive scale-of-operations effect γ.
To conclude this section, Table 2 summarizes the benchmark parameters and moments used in the calibration. We next compute the value for optimal taxes at the top. Share of labor costs to total sales at the topκ 0.93
Notes: ε and σ are imposed exogenously. Firm elasticities are estimated from the data as described in Section 5.2. γ, a, and κ are computed using (27), (32), and (33), respectively.
O P T I M A L T O P I N C O M E T A X A T I O N I N T H E U S
Substituting the parameters of the benchmark calibration from Table 2 into our top tax formula (20), we obtain the optimal tax rate implied by our environment:
The prescribed value for top marginal rates relies crucially on the estimated value of γ and its influence on a. To see this, it is instructive to compare the result with the case in which the scale-of-operations effects is shut down: By imposing γ = 0, we obtain a γ=0 = 1.59 and the corresponding tax rate is almost double our benchmark at 65.4 percent. (For comparison, Diamond and Saez (2011) use a value of a = 1.5.)
counterpart we take the CEO-to-worker pay ratio among the 100 highest-grossing publicly traded companies in the United States from PAYSCALE (see http://www.payscale.com/data-packages/ceo-income/full-list). The average across these top firms is 87.4, which closely matches what the estimated κ implies. 38 The same conclusion holds when calibrating a using the income distribution, as discussed in Appendix E.
We next proceed to study the effect of the elasticity of labor supply (ε) and the degree of substitutability across inputs (σ) on the optimal top marginal tax rates. These are reported in Table 3 . As expected, we observe that tax rates are decreasing in ε. To evaluate the impact of σ, we use two values. The fist one (σ = 4.5) is close to the lower bound consistent with γ ≥ 0 in the benchmark calibration. The second value (σ = 10) is an arbitrarily large number. We see that marginal tax rates are increasing in σ, but optimal tax rates are relatively insensitive to variations in this parameter. It is worth noting that whenever we change ε or γ, we recompute γ and a using (27) and (32), respectively.
The table also shows marginal taxes when imposing γ = 0. Compared to our benchmark results, marginal taxes are higher, but the difference between the two (in relative terms) is decreasing as labor supply becomes more inelastic. Figure 3 displays the previous observations for wider ranges of ε and σ. Notes: T (θ) denotes optimal tax rate as imputed by (20) . The values for γ and a are computed using (27) and (32), respectively. T γ=0 (θ) denotes the optimal tax rates with the exogenous constraint of γ = 0.
To conclude, it is useful to compare the baseline optimal tax rate of 32 
Relationship with Saez (2001)
In Section 4 we showed how the classic (DS) tax formula is recovered in the case with γ = 0. That formula was expressed in terms of primitives of the environment, namely the distribution of managerial talent and the structural parameters of the production function. We now relate our formula to an alternative expression in Saez (2001) which utililizes the income distribution, instead of the distribution of skills.
In our environment, for a given value of a we can recover the tail parameter for the distribution of income, a π , by applying the following identity (see Appendix E for a derivation):
substituting in (20) we get:
It is then immediate that in the case with no scale-of-operations effect (γ = 0) or in the Cobb-Douglas case (ρ = 0) then we get T = 1/(1 + a π ε) as in Saez (2001) and Diamond and Saez (2011) .
Equation (35) allows us to understand further the novel forces present in this environment.
As discussed in Diamond and Saez (2011) marginal taxes at the top can be understood by looking at the tail parameter of the distribution of talent (a) and the income elasticity of the after tax rate e ≡ ∂ log π(θ) ∂ log(1−τ ) . In equation (34) we see how the presence of the scale-of-operations effect creates a wedge between the distribution of income and the distribution of managerial talent. This wedge is a force for lower taxes (since it points towards a higher value of a). At the same time, firm level distortions that emerge with the scale-of-operations effect (as long as ρ = 0) generate a lower response of income to taxes, which is a force for higher marginal tax rates. In the two cases discussed above, these two forces cancel each other perfectly. However, this is not true in general as our benchmark environment has demonstrated. Remark 1. The standard approach in public finance to the issue of optimal top income taxation relies heavily on estimating the elasticity of taxable income in reduced form (see, for example Saez et al. (2012) and Piketty et al. (2014) ). Our approach, on the other hand, recognises that this elasticity is endogenous to policy, and that firm level distortions may have a particularly strong effect. Indeed, as we show in Appendix D, absent firm size distortions the value of the elasticity of taxable income is given by the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. This would be a case in which the value of "e" generated by the model would be consistent with the one estimated from the data. Stiglitz (1982) shows that the presence of endogenous wages provides a rationale for lowering top income tax rates. The logic is the following.
Relationship with Stiglitz (1982)
Suppose that labor supplies of individuals with different skills are complements into the production function. Under this scenario, reducing marginal taxes on individuals with high ability induces them to increase their labor supply and, thus, increases the productivity of individuals with lower ability. The latter reduces wage disparities across skills, which relaxes incentive constraints. This insight has been recently extended to richer assignment models (see, e.g, Rothschild and Scheuer (2013) , ).
While our quantitative results also imply lower top tax rates than in environments with exogenous wages, it is important to note that we abstract from Stiglitz-type effects both within and across occupations. First of all, effort decisions of any given manager have no impact on other managers' wages. The reason is that managers of different abilities are perfect substitutes into the aggregate production function (which is the sum of firms' outputs). Second, while an increment in managerial effort does increase the productivity of the workers, the resulting reduction in wage dispersion across occupations does not relax incentive constraints of the manager. This is because occupations in our model are perfectly observable. In other words, a crucial assumption in Stiglitz (1982) is that the government uses a single tax schedule on different types of labor. Our environment, on the other hand, features differential tax treatment of managers and workers. 40 ' 41 40 Scheuer (2014) analyzes both cases in an entrepreneurial model with endogenous entry. 41 Similarly as before, there are no Stliglitz-type forces affecting the taxation on firm sizes.
C R O S S -C O U N T R Y R E S U L T S
A contribution of this paper is to make operational the study of optimal top income tax rates by using firm-level data. This is appealing since, in most countries, this data is publicly available given the regulatory requirements on publicly traded firms. For example, COMPUSTAT GLOBAL contains detailed fundamental data for major companies trading on international exchanges dating back to 1987. ORBIS, the multi-country database published by Bureau van Dijk, covers information including sales on more than 50 million companies world-wide. Compensation data for individual top executives in fourteen countries with mandated disclosure rules and many other countries can be obtained from BoardEx, which is compiled by the UK-based firm Management Diagnostics Limited. Notes: For all the non-US countries, we obtain aL, d ln π d ln y , and d ln y d ln L according to the following procedure. The firm size Pareto tail parameter aL is estimated from aL = d ln y d ln L ay. The estimates of firm sales Pareto tail parameter ay are taken from di Giovanni and Levchenko (2013) based on ORBIS database. The estimates of CEO pay-sales elasticities d ln π d ln y are taken from Fernandes et al. (2013) . The sales-size elasticity d ln y d ln L is estimated using the same methodology described in Section 5.2 for 2000-2012. The data for Canada is from COMPUSTAT NOR TH AMERICA, whereas those for all the other non-US countries are from COMPUSTAT GLOBAL.
Next we calculate optimal top income tax for a panel of eleven non-US countries with mandated disclosure of executive compensation, including nine European countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherland, Sweden, Switzerland, UK), Australia, and Canada. 42 For this purpose, we take the estimates of firm sales Pareto tail parameters from di Giovanni and Levchenko (2013) who estimate the country-by-country power laws using firmlevel sales from ORBIS. The firm size Pareto tail parameter is then obtained by a L = d ln y d ln L a y . For the CEO pay data, we restrict our sample to those that have mandated disclosure of executive compensation. In particular, the estimates of CEO pay-sales elasticities d ln π d ln y are taken from Fernandes et al. (2013) . The sales-size elasticity d ln y d ln L is estimated using the same methodology in Section 5.2 based on COMPUSTAT NOR TH AMERICA for Canada and COMPUSTAT GLOBAL for the other non-US countries.
In Table 4 , we present the estimates for a L , d ln π d ln y , and d ln y d ln L , along with the implied values for γ, a, and optimal top tax rates with and without the scale-of-operations effect. The results for the US are displayed at the bottom of the table for comparison. Figure 4 displays the scatter plots by country of the optimal top income tax rates versus log(a + 1) and log(γ + 1). Our findings on the optimal top income tax rates are strikingly robust across countries.
log(a + 1)
For all the non-US countries, the estimated scale-of-operations effect γ is positive, and the estimated distribution of talent is significantly less skewed than firm size. Consequently, the optimal tax rates are lower once we consider the scale-of-operations effect relative to the case without it (compare T (θ), vs. T γ=0 (θ)). Most of the differences in top tax rates across countries are explained by variations in the firm size tail index (Column 1) and in the pay-size elasticity (Column 2). The U.S., the Netherlands, and Sweden, have high values of γ and a and hence are at the bottom of the marginal tax rate. In comparison, Switzerland and Italy have low values of a, thereby standing at the top of the spectrum. Comparing the patterns in scatter plots 4(a) and 4(b), model implied optimal top tax rates vary more significantly with estimated a than γ.
This confirms that the effect from a more compressed managerial talent distribution dominates in lowering top tax rates.
O P T I M A L F I R M S I Z E T A X A T I O N
As emphasized in Section 4.1, the marginal product of labor at the optimum is typically not equalized across firms. This feature is necessary for incentive provision and, in our decentralization, translates into nonzero marginal taxes on firm size (see equation (14)). In this section we characterize optimal taxes on firm size in a calibrated example. Unlike in previous sections where we focused on taxation at the top, here we compute firm size taxes over the entire talent distribution in order to study progressivity.
We focus on US data and take the values for the parameters a, ε, σ, and γ from Table   2 . In addition, here we assume that the talent distribution is Pareto-Lognormal 43 with θ ∼ P lN (ζ, ι 2 , a), and following Mankiw et al. (2009) we set ζ = 2.76 and ι = 0.56. To calibrate β (the share parameter on the production function), we use the definition of κ which implies:
From the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database, the average team size defined by the number of production workers per non-production worker is estimated to be 3.58. Using this number to proxy nθ L −1 , the equation above and our benchmark value of κ ≈ 0.93 together imply β ≈ 0.18. Finally, the social welfare function (refer to (PO)) is Ψ(U ) = U 1/2 . Table 5 reports optimal marginal firm size taxes across firm size percentiles. Two facts where it asymptotes at around 2 percent.
C O N C L U S I O N
The title of this paper is a reference to the thought provoking novel of Rand (1957) . 44 In this dystopian novel, top income earners have a vital role in the workings of the economy 43 That is, θ d =θ1θ2, where θ1 ∼ LN (ζ, ι 2 ) and θ2 ∼ P (a). 44 The excellent survey of Slemrod (2000) also features a similar title. and threaten to stop the "world's motor" in response to increasing government regulation. In this paper we aim to quantify the scope of such types of actions within an optimal taxation framework. We model top income earners as managers whose effort, talent, and hired labor jointly contribute to generate output. We quantify the forces shaping optimal tax rates by estimating the distribution of talent at the top, and the impact of managers on the firm's overall productivity (here referred to as the scale-of-operation effect). This paper makes three main contributions. First, we find that top tax rates should be substantially lower than what previous recommendations ignoring the scale-of-operation effect have found. The second contribution is methodological, as we show how to exploit firm level data (as opposed to surveys or censuses eliciting workers' income) to pin down key parameters relevant for income taxation. Lastly, we provide normative grounds for implementing firm size taxes.
The logical next step involves taking a closer look at the role of managers within the production process. Two extensions come to mind. The first one is to analyze optimal taxes in richer hierarchical organizations rather than in two-rank firms. A second extension is to study how has the contribution of managerial talent evolved over time, as well as its consequences for tax design.
A P P E N D I X A P R O O F O F P R O P O S I T I O N 1
Define M (θ , θ) ≡ c(θ ) − v(n(y(θ ), L(θ ), θ)). Incentive compatibility (4) requires that for all θ ∈ Θ, M (θ , θ) attains a global maximum at θ = θ. We start by characterizing local maxima of M (θ , θ) at θ = θ using the following lemma.
where n(θ, θ) = n(θ) and n i (θ, θ) = n i (θ) for i = y, L, θ, yθ, Lθ.
Proof. The first order condition for θ = θ to be a local maximum of M (θ , θ) is M 1 (θ, θ) = 0. 45 This is equivalent to (A.1). Differentiating the first order condition M 1 (θ, θ) = 0 with respect to θ gives M 11 (θ) + M 12 (θ) = 0. Hence, the second order condition M 11 (θ) ≤ 0 can be written as −M 12 (θ) ≤ 0, which gives (A.2).
We now go back to the proof of Proposition 1, which shows that M (θ , θ) attains a global maximum at θ = θ when (A.1) and (A.2) hold. The proof follows standard arguments.
Proof. We want to show that M 1 (θ , θ) has the sign of (θ − θ ). First note that (2) is immediate by incentive compatibility. Now define taxes T , T L , and a wage w such that:
where R(y, L) is the retention function defined in (B.1). Clearly, many different tax-wage combinations satisfy the relationship in (B.3). 46 Claim 1 then implies that each of those combinations, {c(θ), y(θ), L(θ)} solves the θ-manager's problem in (MP).
To complete the proof of the decentralization, define the transfer φ ≡ c w − w, where c w is the consumption of the worker at the optimum. Given this level φ, the worker's budget constraint holds with equality at the optimal allocation. The optimum also satisfies market clearing conditions by construction, while the government's budget is balanced by Walras' law.
We compute the Pareto optimal allocation by solving the optimal control problem (PO-FOC) where y(θ) and L(θ) are the controls and U (θ) is the state variable. After integrating by parts, the Lagrangian to the planner's problem is (suppressing dependencies with respect to θ, y and L):
where λ r is the multiplier on (7), λ l is the multiplier on (8) and µ(θ) is the costate on (5) that also satisfies the boundary conditions µ(θ) = lim θ→θ µ(θ) = 0. It is straightforward to show that all of these multipliers are positive.
Optimality conditions with respect to the controls y and L are, respectively,
Now let (y, L, θ) be such that n(y, L, θ) =n, wheren is a given level of effort. By applying the implicit function theorem we have that
Rearranging the first order conditions (B.4) and (B.5) we get n y [λ r v f − µv n θ ] = λ r f + µv n θy , and n L [λ r v f − µv n θ ] = −λ l f + µv n θL , so that
Using (14), (B.8) and substituting the expression for w = λ l /λ r we derive equation (15). To prove Part 2, suppose that n θ = g(n) for all θ. It follows that for all θ n θL n θy = n L n y . (B.9)
Rearranging (B.8) and substituting (B.9) we get − n θL n θy λ r = λ l . Simplifying and substituting (B.9) we get −n L /n y = λ l /λ r , so that T L = 0. 
Substitute (B.12) into the above yields
By Assumption 1 and (B.11) we get
Next we write the partial derivatives of n in (B.13) in terms of partial derivatives of y. Let (n, L, θ) be such that y(n, L, θ) =ȳ, whereȳ is a given level of output. 
using the above and (B.17) we get
( Differentiating and re-arranging, we get:
Substituting (C.2) in the above we obtain the result.
We now move to the proof of Lemma 1. As notation, let g = θ γ and g = γθ γ−1 .
Proof. Differentiating (22) and (23) Then applying (C.1) and (C.2) and rearranging gives (24). Now we obtain equation (25) where κ = wL/y. Substituting (24) and (25) into (C.7) and rearranging gives (26).
C.2 P R O O F O F P R O P O S I T I O N 5
Proof. The following relationships are derived by combining (24) 
D F I R M D I S T O R T I O N S A N D T A X E L A S T I C I T I E S
In this section we show that if there are no firm level distortions, a wage rate exists for the effective effort of the manager such that the income elasticity of the after tax rate equals the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. We first show that at the optimum it is possible to write the income of managers of talent θ as π(θ) = ω(θ, w)n where ω(θ, w) is the wage of managers of talent θ exercising effort n. The first order condition with respect to L is: θ γ H 2 (θn, L) = w. Since H 2 is a homogeneous of degree zero function we have θ γ H 2 (θn/L, 1) = w so that θn L = H −1 2 w θ γ , 1 . This relationship implies that for a given θ and w the relationship between θn and L is linear. Define m(θ, w) = 1/H −1 2 w θ γ , 1 . So that L = m(θ, w)θn. Substituting in the expression for profits we have: π(θ, n) = θ γ H(θn, m(θ, w)θn) − m(θ, w)wθn. Since H is homogeneous of degree one we have: π(θ, n) = θ γ+1 H(1, m(θ, w)) − wm(θ, w)θ n = ω(θ, w)n.
We can now write the problem of the manager as: max c(θ) − v(n(θ)) s.t. c(θ) = (1 − τ )ω(θ, w)n.
First order conditions of the above problem can be written as n(θ) = (v ) −1 [(1 − τ )ω(θ, w)], so that: ∂n ∂(1 − τ ) = 1 v (n(θ))
· ω(θ, w) = v (n(θ)) v (n(θ)) · 1 (1 − τ )
, (D.1)
where the second equality follows from the first order condition. Substituting (D.1):
e ≡ ∂ log ω(θ, w)n ∂ log(1 − τ ) = ∂n(θ) ∂(1 − τ ) · 1 − τ n(θ) = ε.
This analysis would not apply in the case of a firm being subject to distortionary taxes, or if the size of the firm size is fixed.
E E S T I M A T I N G a F R O M T H E I N C O M E D I S T R I B U T I O N
In Subsection 5.3 we estimated a using the distribution of firm sizes. In this section we proceed similarly but focusing on the distribution of income, instead. From equation (26) in Lemma 1 we have that ln π(θ) = 1 + γ 1 − κ(θ)
(1 + ε) ln θ.
Approximating κ(θ) =κ and substituting in (29) we get
ln π(θ i ).
Assume that in the data income is distributed according to a Pareto distribution with tail parameter a π . We then have 1 aπ = 1 N N i=1 ln π(θ i ). Substituting in the above we get:
